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Some Observations on the
Establishment Clause
WILLIAM FRENCH SMITH*
As evidenced by current interpretations of the establishment clause,
lower federal court decisions indicate an increased tendency of hostility
toward religion. In this article, Attorney General William French Smith
surveys the history of the establishment clause and Supreme Court deci-
sions regarding religious issues. Attorney General Smith then notes the re-
cent success of the Reagan Administration's efforts, through amicus curiae
briefs, to advocate an interpretation of the establishment clause which per-
mits the states to take an attitude of benevolent neutrality toward religion.
The article then concludes that such a position is both historically and ju-
dicially sound.
Over the past few decades, the establishment clause of the first
amendment has been one of the most controversial and widely-
debated provisions of the Constitution. Since 1947, when the
Court held in Everson v. Board of Education' that the establish-
ment clause created a "wall of separation" between church and
state, judges and legal scholars have taken divergent positions on
the meaning of the establishment clause and the impregnability
of the "wall of separation" it created.
The "wall of separation" metaphor itself has proven trouble-
some. While of great popularity as a short-hand description of the
meaning of the establishment clause, the metaphor can hardly be
said to reflect accurately the delicate interplay between govern-
ment and religion under the opposing constitutional requirements
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." 2 Indeed, the
Supreme Court itself has disavowed any such absolute separa-
* A.B., 1939, University of California at Los Angeles; LLB., 1942, Harvard
Law School. Attorney General of the United States. This article was adapted from
a speech delivered on February 5, 1984 at Pepperdine Law School. I must express
my indebtedness to the editors of the Pepperdine Law Review for their assistance
in adapting the speech into this article.
1. 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
2. U.S. CoNSrw. amend. 1.
tion, noting in Lynch v. Donnelly that "[t] he concept of a 'wall' of
separation is a useful figure of speech .. . But the metaphor it-
self is not a wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of
the relationships that in fact exist between church and state."3
Moreover, recent Supreme Court decisions give some indication
of an encouraging trend toward a more benevolent accommoda-
tion of religion in interpretation of the establishment clause.
This article will survey briefly the Supreme Court decisions
bearing on the interpretation of the clause, viewing the cases in
light of the first amendment's original intent. Based on this anal-
ysis, the article will explain how the Reagan Administration has
sought to encourage an interpretation of the establishment clause
which, in keeping with the purposes of the Framers, results in a
more balanced treatment and accommodation of religion and reli-
gious values.
I. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Many of the drafters of the Constitution, including James
Madison, the Father of the Constitution 4 and chief architect of the
establishment clause,5 thought the first amendment (including
the establishment clause) was unnecessary. Madison and many
of his colleagues regarded the Constitution in its original and un-
amended form as being itself a bill of rights.6 Madison reasoned
that because the original Constitution created a federal govern-
ment of only delegated powers,7 which did not include the autho-
rity to establish a national religion, the federal government would
not usurp the power to "intermeddle with religion."8
Furthermore, in the understanding of Madison and other lead-
ing Framers, the original Constitution reflected a new science of
politics that included several principles. Some were familiar: the
principles of representation, separation of powers, and federal-
ism.9 Other principles were less familiar, such as the idea of cre-
ating an extended republic. For Madison, the extended republic,
a nation of great size and population, would be religiously diverse.
According to Madison, "[tjhe United States is abound in such a
variety of sects, that is a strong security against religious persecu-
3. 52 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4318 (1984).
4. A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTrruTiON 108 (5th ed. 1976).
5. R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CUR-
RENT FICTION 5 (1982).
6. Id. at 8.
7. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). See also Gilman
v. City of Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865) (all sovereign powers not spe-
cifically delegated to federal government are reserved to states).
8. THE COMPLETE MADISON 306 (S. Padover ed. 1953).
9. A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, "upra note 4, at 154-56.
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tion, and it is sufficient to authorize a conclusion, that no one sect
will ever be able to outnumber or depress the rest."'10
Nevertheless, in order to obtain ratification of the Constitution,
its supporters promised during the ratification process amend-
ments to protect both the citizens and the states against exces-
sive federal power." In fulfillment of this promise, Madison
introduced in the First Congress several proposed amendments
which eventually became the Bill of Rights.12
Religion was a prime concern of many state ratifying conven-
tions in adopting the Constitution. For example, the Virginia Rat-
ifying Convention proposed an amendment which stated in part:
"no particular religious sect or society ought to be favored or es-
tablished, by law, in preference to others."13 Similar resolutions
were passed in Maryland, New York, North Carolina, and Rhode
Island.14 Reflecting the states' concern, the House Committee of
the Whole adopted a version of the establishment clause which
read: "No religion shall be established by law."15 Congressman
Peter Sylvester of New York voiced his fear that such a version
would "be thought to have a tendency to abolish religion alto-
gether."16 In response, Madison stated that the language of the
establishment clause 'was intended to prevent" what the people
feared - "one sect [obtaining] a pre-eminence, or two [combin-
ing] together, and establishing a religion to which they would
compel others to conform."' 7
After many additional adjustments and amendments by the
House, Senate, and Conference Committee,' 8 the establishment
clause as it is known today emerged: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion."19
The final wording of the establishment clause is critical to its in-
tended meaning. The clause prohibited "an establishment of reli-
10. THE COMPLETE MADHSON, supra note 8, at 306.
11. A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, supra note 4, at 164. See also Barron v. Balti-
more, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (Bill of Rights held not applicable to states).
12. A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, supra note 4, at 164.
13. 3 J. ELLoTr, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONsTrrUTnON 659 (1901) (emphasis
added).
14. R. CoRD, supra note 5, at 6-7.
15. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. '129 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 731.
18. For various versions of the establishment clause Which were adopted by
the House and Senate, see R. CORD, supra note 5, at 7-9.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
gion." Had the First Congress chosen to prohibit the
establishment of religion, then the generic word "religion" would
have been emphasized and the clause could have been subject to
an interpretation that would prohibit all official preferences of
religion over non-religion. However, the drafters' actual use of
"an establishment" indicates their desire to prohibit only those
official activities which promoted the interests of one or more
sects above all others.20
In summary, Madison's belief that the establishment clause was
unnecessary, the state ratifying conventions' resolutions, the
framers' statements made during the drafting of the establish-
ment clause, and the actual words of the establishment clause all
point to one conclusion: the proper interpretation of the estab-
lishment clause is to prohibit those official activities which tend to
promote the interests of one particular sect over all others and
not to preclude all official preferences of religion over irreligion.
Nevertheless, the same historical evidence of the genesis of the
establishment clause has been interpreted by some,2 1 including
the United States Supreme Court,22 to support the proposition
that the drafters intended the clause to prohibit all official activi-
ties which tended to aid religion. Although the historical evi-
dence is often used to support both the nonpreferential and the
absolute separation interpretations of the establishment clause,
the American experience, until the Supreme Court's relatively re-
cent involvement, supports the nonpreferential interpretation. 23
20. M. MALBim, RELIGION AND POLITICS 14-15 (1978).
21. See, e.g., L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM passim (1967)
(stressing different historical facts and giving short shrift to facts highlighted in
this article, Pfeffer concludes that the establishment clause prohibited the estab-
lishment of a state church and precluded any government aid to religious groups
or beliefs); H. PRITCHETT, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 401 (3d ed. 1977) (because
state aid to religious organizations at the time of the drafting of the establishment
clause included every religious group with enough members to form a church,
thereby excluding non-Protestants in most states, the establishment clause was
designed to forbid such nonpreferential assistance to religious organizations).
22. In Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the Court, speaking
through Justice Black, reviewed the history of the establishment clause and con-
cluded that its purpose was to prohibit all official activities which tended to aid
religion. Among the facts relied upon by Justice Black in his conclusion were: (a)
many early colonial settlers came to America to escape laws compelling citizens to
support and attend government favored churches; (b) early attempts to establish
churches in America resulted in persecution of dissenters which shocked the
colonials into an attitude of abhorrence; (c) Madison's Memorial and Remon-
strance Against Religious Assessments which was the impetus for Virginia's dises-
tablishment of the Anglican Church; (d) Jefferson's Virginia Bill for Religious
Liberty which guaranteed Virginians freedom from being compelled to support
any religion; and (e) Madison and Jefferson's leading roles in the drafting and
adoption of the establishment clause. Id. at 8.
23. See generally R. CORD, supra note 5, at 49-82; R. MORGAN, THE SUPREME
COURT AND RELIGION 27-55 (1972).
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The same Congress which drafted the establishment clause cre-
ated congressional 24 and military 25 chaplaincies, which continue
to this day. Federal funds were committed for many years to con-
struct church buildings in accordance with Indian treaties.26 Sim-
ilarly, until late in the nineteenth century, Congress appropriated
hundreds of thousands; of dollars annually to support the sectar-
ian education of Indians by religious organizations.2 7 Finally,
Presidents Washington, Adams, and Madison issued
Thanksgiving Day Proclamations setting aside a day in which all
the people of the nation would join together and express their
thanks to God for His benefits and protection. 28
Meanwhile, in the states, which under the Constitution and Bill
of Rights were left to deal with issues surrounding religion as
they wished,29 established churches were in the process of being
abolished. In 1775, at the outbreak of the American Revolutionary
War, nine of the thirteen original colonies had established
24. Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3333-34 (1983). Furthermore, Madison
served on the committee which recommended the chaplaincy. R. CORD, supra
note 5, at 23.
25. R. CORD, supra note 5, at 54.
26. Id. at 57-61.
27. Id. at 61-80.
28. Id. at 51-53. President Washington's first "National Thanksgiving Procla-
mation" read, in part:
PROCLAMATION
A NATIONAL THANKSGIVING
Whereas it is the duty of all nations to acknowledge the providence of
Almighty God, to obey His will, to be grateful for His benefits, and humbly
to impore His protection. and favor....
. Now, therefore, I do recommend and assign Thursday, the 26th day
of November next, to be, devoted by people of these States to the service
of that great and glorious Being who is the beneficent author of all the
good that was, that is, or that will be; that we may then all united in ren-
dering unto Him our sincere and humble thanks for His kind care and pro-
tection of the people of this country previous to their becoming a nation.
1 A COMPILATION OF THE M ESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897 64
(J. Richardson ed. 1901), reprinted in R. CORD, supra note 5, at 51-52.
29. The Constitution delegated certain express powers to the newly created
federal government, but the new government had no power except those the Con-
stitution granted. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). All
sovereign powers not specifically delegated to the federal government or prohib-
ited to the states were reserved to the states. U.S. CONST. amend. X; Gilman v.
City of Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1852). Because the Constitution did not
prohibit the states from dealing with matters of religion, the ratification of the
Constitution and the adoption of the establishment clause had no effect on the
states' power to establish a religion. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243
(1833).
churches.30 By 1787 when the Constitutional Convention con-
vened, five states retained an established religion,31 and it was not
until 1833 when the last state, Massachusetts, disestablished its
church.32 Although states disestablished their official churches,
they maintained a variety of involvements in religion including
legislative chaplaincies, 33 the teaching of religion in public
schools, 34 and the requirement or encouragement of prayer and
other devotional exercises in public schools. 35
In conclusion, the history of the drafting of the establishment
clause, the actions of its drafters, 36 and the American experience
may indicate that the establishment clause was intended only to
prohibit any official activity which tended to promote the interests
of only one or a few sects. Into this settled state of affairs stepped
the United States Supreme Court with its decision in Everson v.
Board of Education. 37
II. A BRIEF SURVEY OF SUPREME COURT ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
DECISIONS AND THEIR EFFECT
In 1947, the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Everson v.
30. R. CORD, supra note 5, at 4. The Anglican Church was the established
church in Virginia, New York, Maryland, North and South Carolina, and Georgia.
The Congregational Church was established in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and
New Hampshire. Id. States had established churches in that public monies were
provided to support the churches and, in some states, there was a requirement of
Protestantism or piety to hold public office. R. MORGAN, supra note 27, at 30.
31. R. CORD, supra note 5, at 4 (Georgia, South Carolina, Connecticut, Massa-
chusetts, and New Hampshire).
32. Id.
33. Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983) (Court upheld against an estab-
lishment clause attack Nebraska's practice of retaining a chaplain, chosen by the
legislature and paid with public funds, to offer a prayer at each legislative
session).
34. R. MORGAN, supra note 23, at 49.
35. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Court struck down Penn-
sylvania statute requiring the reading of at least ten verses from the Bible without
comment and recitation of the Lord's Prayer with exemption for any student upon
the written request of his or her parent or guardian).
36. In answer to this evidence (which indicates that the very drafters of the
establishment clause would have violated it under an absolute separation inter-
pretation), Pfeffer, who advocates such a broad interpretation, points to a docu-
ment discovered in 1946 in Madison's handwriting. L. PFEFFER, supra note 21, at
170. In his Detached Memoranda, Madison reflected that his earlier support of and
participation in establishing the congressional chaplaincy system and
thanksgiving proclamations violated the establishment clause. Madison's De-
tached Memoranda, 3 WM. & MARY Q. 535, 558 & 560 (E. Fleet ed. 1946). Cord
counters Pfeffer's argument by asserting that Madison should be judged by "his
behavior, statements, and actions while he was a public servant in the House [of
Representatives] and in the Presidency making policy and accountable for it" and
not the reflections of an old man retired from public service "regrettjing] some of
his past actions." R. CORD, supra note 5, at 35-36 (emphasis omitted).
37. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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Board of Education38 began the federal judiciary's deep involve-
ment in establishment clause issues. In Everson, the Supreme
Court, through Justice Black, extended the proscriptions of the
establishment clause to the states for the first time.39 Further-
more, the Everson Court, relying primarily on the writings of Jef-
ferson and Madison,40 interpreted the establishment clause to
mean:
The "establishment"... clause ... means at least this: Neither a state
nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over an-
other. . . . No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support
any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a
state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in
the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the
words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was
38. Id. Pursuant to a New Jersey statute, a local school board had authorized
the reimbursement of funds expended by parents to transport their children to
private schools on public buses. The Court upheld the program against an estab-
lishment clause challenge by a 5 to 4 vote.
39. Id. at 15. "The broad. meaning given the [Fourteenth I Amendment ... has
been accepted by this Court in its decisions concerning an individual's religious
freedom rendered since the Fourteenth Amendment was interpreted to make the
prohibitions of the First applicable to state action abridging religious freedom."
Id. Although this rather broad statement was followed by a citation to Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), Cantwell only applied thefree exercise clause to
the states. Therefore, contrary to Justice Black's reliance on precedent, Everson
was the first case in which the Court had made the restrictions of the establish-
ment clause applicable to the states.
Some commentators have questioned the validity of Justice Black's incorpora-
tion of the establishment clause against the states. For example, Professor Gun-
ther has stated: "ITIhe 'incorporation' in Everson of the 'establishment' [clause]
took place without considering the textual difficulty of using the 'liberty' of the
14th Amendment as the incorporation route." G. GUNTHER, CONSTrrIUONAL LAW
1553 n.1 (10th ed. 1980). The textual difficulty of incorporating the establishment
clause has been explained as follows:
The provision in the First Amendment forbidding an establishment of
religion was thus a resiraint on Congress only. When, however, we come
to the Fourteenth restraining the States, it is applicable only to such re-
straints as invade some person's "liberty". The "free exercise" of religion
is a liberty, but "an establishment of religion" is not necessarily a depriva-
tion of the liberty of individuals, but primarily a regulation of government
relations. While a State might establish a church in such a way as to
abridge the religious freedom of persons of other creeds, it might also es-
tablish a church in a manner which abridged no one's freedom at all. If, in
fact, it does abridge religious freedom, this would violate the [free exer-
cise] clause.
Drinker, Some Observations on the Four Freedoms of the First Amendmen 37
B.U.L. REV. 1, 55 (1957) (footnotes omitted). See also R. CORD, supra note 5, at 109-
14.
40. 330 U.S. at 11-15.
intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and State."4 1
Thus, in Everson, the Court held that the establishment clause
required states to be neutral in religious issues.42 One year later,
relying on this principle, the Court for the first time, in McCollum
v. Board of Education, 43 struck down an action by a local school
board as unconstitutional under the establishment clause. In Mc-
Collum, the offending state action was a program permitting stu-
dents to receive religious instruction during the school day, on
school property, taught by various religiously affiliated persons.44
In 1962 in Engle v. Vitale, 45 and in 1963 in School District v.
Schempp, 46 the Court addressed a different church-state issue:
whether or not the state oversteps constitutional bounds by
financing or conducting religious exercises. Relying on Everson,
the Court strove to maintain a "complete and unequivocal" 47 sep-
aration of church and state by striking down state composed or
sponsored school prayers and devotions.
41. Id. at 15-16 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
42. The concept of governmental neutrality is, in effect, an attempt to harmo-
nize the inherent discord between the two first amendment clauses pertaining to
religion. The amendment dictates that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ." U.S.
CONST. amend. I. The first clause, the establishment clause, is a mandate not to
establish a religion; the latter, the free exercise clause, is a mandate not to inhibit
the practice of religion. See generally P. KuRLAND, RELIGION AND LAw 112 (1962).
The Court's experience with the governmental neutrality concept, however, has
been somewhat unsuccessful in harmonizing the inherent conflict between the
religion clauses.
43. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
44. The Court held that the "released time" program used the classrooms for
religious instruction and that the force of the public school was used to promote
that instruction. The practice was held to be "beyond all question a utilization of
the tax-established and tax-supported public school system to aid religious groups
to spread their faith" and, therefore, unconstitutional. Id. at 209-10.
Only four years later, the Court appeared to contradict itself by holding a simi-
lar program constitutional in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). The Court,
speaking through Justice Douglas, distinguished the New York City program in
Zorach from the Illinois program in McCollum because the Zorach program
neither involved religious instruction in the public school classrooms nor the ex-
penditure of public funds. The Zorach program permitted students to leave school
grounds and go to religious centers for religious instruction or devotional exer-
cises. Any costs incurred were paid by the sponsoring religious organizations. Id.
at 312-15.
Justice Black, in his dissenting opinion, however, believed the distinction recog-
nized by the majority was illusory. Id. at 315-20 (Black, J., dissenting). For a dis-
cussion on this area, see Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed
Constitutional Standard, 47 MINN. L. REv. 329 (1963).
45. 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (non-denominational prayer prepared by the New
York Board of Regents for use in the public schools was found to be "Wholly in-
consistent with the Establishment Clause").
46. 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding unconstitutional the Pennsylvania practice of
opening the school day with a recitation of the Lord's Prayer along with the read-
ing of Bible verses).
47. Id. at 220 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952)).
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In 1971, the Supreme Court returned to the issue first raised in
Everson, the constitutionality of state financial aid to church-re-
lated schools. In Lemon v. Kurtzman,48 the Court refined estab-
lishment clause jurisprudence which had developed and been
applied over the previous twenty-five years. Writing for the
Court, Chief Justice Burger announced a three part test: one, the
challenged state activity must have a secular purpose; two, it
must have as its principal or primary effect neither the advance-
ment nor inhibition or religion; and three, it must not foster "an
excessive government entanglement" with religion.49 To pass
constitutional muster, the challenged activity must pass all three
requirements. 50
The Court has since applied the Lemon standard to establish-
ment clause questions for better than a decade. To some observ-
ers, the results are confusing and inconsistent.5 1 For example,
the Supreme Court has approved government aid to church-re-
lated colleges 52 but not to sectarian primary and secondary
schools. 53 It has approved government funding of bus transporta-
tion to parochial schools 5 4 but struck down such funding of trans-
portation for field trips.55 It has approved state aid to parochial
48. 403 US. 602 (1971).
49. Id. at 612. The test is generally regarded as the standard under which all
establishment challenges must pass.
50. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980) (Kentucky law requiring posting
of a copy of the Ten Commandments on the walls of a public classroom was held
unconstitutional even though purchased with private contributions).
51. See R. MORGAN, supra note 23, at 123-64; Choper, The Establishment Clause
and Aid to Parochial Schoos, 56 CALiF. L. REV. 260 (1968); Nowak, The Supreme
Court, the Religion Clauses and the Nationalization of Education, 70 Nw. U.L. REV.
883 (1976); Seeburger, Public Policy Against Religion: Doubting Thomas, 11 PEP-
PERDINE L. REV. 311 (1984).
52. See, e.g., Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (ap-
proving annual noncategorical grants to eligible private colleges); Hunt v. McNair,
413 U.S. 734 (1973) (upholding a construction aid program allowing colleges to bor-
row funds at low interest rates); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (sus-
taining federal construction grants to church related colleges).
53. See, e.g., Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (striking
down public funding to reimburse both church-sponsored and secular private
schools for certain mandated state services as violative of the establishment
clause); Nyquist v. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 756
(1973) (public funding for repair and maintenance of church sponsored schools,
tuition reimbursement to low income parents whose children attend sectarian
schools, and income tax benefits to parents of children attending private schools
all held unconstitutional). Apparently, the constitutionality of state aid to sectar-
ian schools is dependant on the age of the students attending the school.
54. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
55. Wolman v. Water, 43:3 U.S. 229 (1977).
schools in the form of textbookss6 but not in the form of other in-
structional materials, such as maps.5 7
The Court's decisions in the school prayer and devotion cases
and refinement of its establishment clause Lemon test have been
interpreted by many state and lower federal courts as precluding
a wide variety of governmental accommodations of religion.58 For
example, courts have prohibited students' voluntary prayers
before meals,5 9 periods of meditation before class, 60 and student
prayer meetings in school buildings outside of class hours. 61 Re-
markably, one court has even held that a school board's decision
to permit students to conduct voluntary meetings for "educa-
tional, religious, moral, or ethical purposes" on school property
before or after class hours violates the establishment clause. 62
Since the 1979 term, the Supreme Court itself has seemed un-
comfortable with the Lemon test, its application in the lower
courts, and even the view of separation of church and state which
underlies the test.63 In 1980, the Court utilized the Lemon stan-
56. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
57. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
58. E.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983). 'The District Court held
that the Establishment Clause was not breached by the prayer but was violated
by paying the chaplain from public funds, and accordingly enjoined the use of
such funds to pay the chaplain." Id. at 3332 (citation omitted). The court of ap-
peals, however, went much further, holding that the whole chaplaincy practice vio-
lated the establishment clause and accordingly prohibiting the state from
engaging in any aspect of the practice. Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228 (8th Cir.
1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983).
59. Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 957
(1966).
60. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983), rev'g Jaffree v. Board of
School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Ala. 1983), and Jaffree v. James, 554 F.
Supp. 1130 (S.D. Ala. 1983), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Jaffree v. Board of
School Comm'rs, 52 U.S.L.W. 3557 (U.S. Nov. 14, 1983) (No. 83-804), and appealfiled
sub nom. Jaffree v. James, 52 U.S.L.W. 3557 (U.S. Nov. 14, 1983) (No. 83-812); May v.
Cooperman, 572 F. Supp. 1561 (D.N.J. 1983); Duffy v. Los Cruces Pub. Schools, 557
F. Supp. 1013 (D.N.M. 1983); Beck v. McElrath, 548 F. Supp. 1161 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
But see Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337 (D. Mass. 1976) (upholding minute of
silence statute).
61. Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1123 (1981).
62. Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038
(5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 800 (1983) (rejecting ostensive purpose to
allow many organizations the opportunity to meet in light of underlying religious
purpose; primary effect of the policy amounted to an impermissible advancement
of religion; and schools' continuing supervision of the meetings created an imper-
missible governmental entanglement). But see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263
(1981) (free speech clause forbids state university from barring a student group
desiring to use its facilities for religious worship and discussion purposes if it
otherwise allows registered student groups to use them).
63. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980). Beyond a sim-
ple articulation of the three-part test, there is little the Court can agree on in this
area. As noted by Justice White in his majority opinion in Regan:
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dard to strike down a Kentucky statute requiring the posting of a
privately-purchased copy of the Ten Commandments on the wall
of each public classroom in the state.64 But a year later, in
Thomas v. Review Board,65 another case involving a religious
claim, the Court struck down, as violative of the free exercise
clause, a state action which attempted to remain religiously neu-
tral. Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, noted that had the state
statutorily provided the relief which the Court had granted to the
claimant, the Court would have held such a statute to be in viola-
tion of the establishment clause under Lemon. 66 This prompted
Justice Rehnquist to inquire whether the Court had "temporarily
retreated from its expansive view of the Establishment Clause."67
To Justice Rehnquist, the only way to resolve the irreconcilable
conflict between the religion clauses is to interpret the establish-
ment clause as prohibiting only selective beneficial treatment of
This is not to say that this case, any more than past cases, will furnish a
litmus-paper test to distinguish permissible from impermissible aid to re-
ligiously oriented schools. But Establishment Clause cases are not easy;
they stir deep feeling; and we are divided among oursleves, perhaps re-
flecting the different views on this subject of the people of this country.
What is certain is that our decisions have tended to avoid categorical im-
peratives and absolutist approaches at either end of the range of possible
outcomes. This course sacrifices clarity and predictability for flexibility,
but this promises to be the case until the continuing interaction between
the courts and the States-the former charged with interpretating and up-
holding the Constitution and the latter seeking to provide education for
their youth-produces a single, more encompassing construction of the
Establishment Clause.
Id. at 662. But see Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (similar statute found un-
constitutional). Such distinctions, as noted by Justice Stevens in his dissenting
opinion in Regan, force the Court to continue "with the sisyphean task of trying to
patch together the 'blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier' described in Lemon v.
Kurtzman." 444 U.S. at 671 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
65. 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (unconstitutional to deny unemployment compensation
to Jehovah's Witness who, because of personal religious beliefs, left his job in a
factory assembling parts for a tank). See Seeburger, supra note 51.
66. 450 U.S. at 726 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
67. Id. "It is unclear from the Court's opinion whether it has temporarily re-
treated from its expansive view of the Establishment Clause, or wholly abandoned
it. I would welcome the latter." Id. (emphasis added). Noting the Court's inability
to harmonize the inherent tension between the free exercise and the establish-
ment clauses, Justice Rehnquist observed: "My difficulty with today's decision is
that it reads the Free Exercise Clause too broadly and it fails to squarely acknowl-
edge that such a reading conflicts with many of our Establishment Clause cases.
As such, the decision simply exacerbates the 'tension' between the two Clauses."
Id. at 727.
religious sects.68
The Supreme Court has recently handed down several impor-
tant establishment clause decisions. In Larkin v. Grendel's Den,
Inc.,69 the Court applied the Lemon test in striking down a Mas-
sachusetts law preventing the licensing of a liquor store within
five hundred feet of a church if the church objected.7 0 In Mueller
v. Allen 7l the Court again applied the Lemon standard, but was
noticeably more deferential to the states' interests then in previ-
ous establishment clause cases. The Court upheld a Minnesota
statute permitting tax deductions for tuition and other school ex-
penses in both public and private sL-hools, including parochial
ones.72 Then, in Marsh v. Chambers, 73 the Court declined to use
the Lemon test in approving Nebraska's practice of sponsoring a
chaplain for the state legislature. 74 Most recently, the Court ap-
plied the Lemon test in Lynch v. Donnelly 75 to a city's inclusion of
a nativity scene in a Christmas seasonal display; however, the
Chief Justice observed that the Court had "repeatedly empha-
sized [its] unwillingness to be confined to any single test or crite-
68. 450 U.S. at 726 (citing School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 314 (1963)
(Stewart, J., dissenting)).
69. 103 S. Ct. 505 (1982).
70. Id. at 507 (statute unconstitutional because it delegated state's regulatory
authority, in part, to churches).
71. 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
72. Id. at 3066-71. The less than rigid application of the three-part Lemon test
elicited a strong dissent by Justice Marshall, with whom Justices Brennan, Black-
mun, and Stevens joined. Id. at 3071 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
73. 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983).
74. 'This unique history leads us to accept the interpretation of the First
Amendment draftsmen who saw no real threat to the Establishment Clause aris-
ing from a practice of prayer similar to that now challenged." Id. at 3335. As
stated by Chief Justice Burger.
In light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200
years, there can be no doubt that the practice of opening legislative ses-
sions with prayer has become part of the fabric of our society. To invoke
Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with making the laws is not,
in these circumstances, an "establishment" of religion or a step toward es-
tablishment; it is simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely
held among the people of this country. As Justice Douglas observed,
"[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being."
Id. at 3336 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)). Justice Brennan
(joined by Justice Marshall), even though recognizing the narrowness of the
Court's decision, filed a strong dissent. Notably, Justice Brennan himself had once
expressed the view that "[t he saying of invocational prayers in the legislative
chambers, state or federal, and the appointment of legislative chaplains, might
well represent no involvement of any kind prohibited by the Establishment
Clause." School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 299-300 (1963) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring). However, Justice Brennan changed his mind in Marsh: "Nevertheless, after
much reflection, I have come to the conclusion that I was wrong then and that the
Court is wrong today." 103 S. Ct. at 3337-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
75. 52 U.S.L.W. 4317 (1984).
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rion in this sensitive area. 7 6
Caution must be exercised in drawing conclusions from these
recent cases. Larkin, and to some extent Lynch, indicates the
Court's unwillingness to completely abandon the Lemon test.
However, an examination of Mueller suggests that the Court is
willing to apply Lemon more loosely than before, at least in the
context of state aid to church-related schools.7 7 Furthermore, the
Court seems inclined to abandon the Lemon standard when a
traditional state involvement in religion, such as the legislative
chaplaincy in Marsh, is at issue.78
III. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S INVOLVEMENT IN
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CASES
The recent movements in the Court's approach to establish-
ment clause issues have been welcomed by the Reagan Adminis-
tration. Indeed, the Administration has encouraged such
movements in amicus curiae briefs in Mueller,79 Marsh, 80 and
Lynch,81 and is continuing with amicus curiae briefs in cases
76. Id. at 4320.
77. 103 S. Ct. at 3066-71. Again making reference to the historic purposes of
the establishment clause, the Court noted:
The Establishment Clause of course extends beyond prohibition of a state
church or payment of state funds to one or more churches. We do not
think, however, that its prohibition extends to the type of tax deduction
established by Minnesota. The historic purposes of the clause simply do
not encompass the sort of attenuated financial benefi, ultimately con-
trolled by the private choices of individual parents, that eventually flows
to parochial schools from the neutrally available tax benefit at issue in
this case.
Id. at 3069 (emphasis added).
78. Marsh, 103 S. Ct. 3330.
79. Amicus Curiae Brief for the United States, Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062
(1983).
80. Amicus Curiae Brief for the United States, Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct.
3330 (1983). The United States argued: "The Lemon test is merely a device for dis-
cerning the proper meaning of the Establishment Clause and for applying its re-
strictions in a modern day context. In this case, where the challenged practice is
one that was actually engaged in by the Framers themselves, and where the in-
tended meaning and scope o:! the Establishment Clause in this context is clear, ap-
plication of the Lemon test would seem superfluous. Nevertheless, a review of the
Nebraska chaplaincy under that test confirms that [it] is constitutionally sound."
Id. at 3-4.
81. Amicus Curiae Brief for the United States, Lynch v. Donnelly, 52 U.S.L.W.
4317 (1984). As in Marsh, the Administration argued that the Lemon test need not
be applied and that a consideration of the intentions of the Framers of the estab-
lishment clause, and more generally of our nation's history, is sufficient to decide
the issue.
presently before the Supreme Court.82 In an Alabama school
prayer case, 83 the Administration has asked the Court to examine
the constitutionality of a statute permitting a moment of silence
in the public schools during which students may pray, meditate,
or do as they please. 84 The Administration is of the belief that
such a statute is consistent with the Constitution, because it ac-
commodates in a neutral and noncoercive way the practice of an
individual's religion.
The Administration hopes that the Court will reassess the con-
sequences of its own establishment clause precedents and the
lower courts' increasing tendency of hostilily toward religion.
Hopefully, the Court will decide that a more subtle analysis of the
establishment clause is in order, one that encourages the states to
take an attitude of, in the Court's own words, "benevolent neu-
trality" toward religion. 85 We are encouraged by the trend the
Court began in Mueller and extended in Marsh and Lynch, as a
break from its previous decisions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Religion, as Tocqueville observed, gave birth to the first colo-
nies. 86 The policy of the Reagan Administration is to make cer-
tain that the hand of government does not suppress the vital
freedom which brought the first colonials to America: freedom to
worship and believe as one sees fit. "The first amendment was
not written to protect the people and their laws from religious val-
ues; it was written to protect those values from government tyr-
anny."87 That is the essence of the establishment clause, and it
82. Amicus Curiae Brief for the United States, Wallace v. Jaffree, appealfiled
sub nom. Jaffree v. James, 52 U.S.L.W. 3557 (U.S. Nov. 14, 1983) (No. 83-812).
83. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983), rev'g Jaffree v. Board of
School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Ala. 1983), and Jaffree v. James, 554 F.
Supp. 1130 (S.D. Ala. 1983), petition for cert. filed sub noma. Jaffree v. Board of
School Comm'rs, 52 U.S.L.W. 3557 (U.S. Nov. 14, 1983) (No. 83-804), and appealfiled
sub nom. Jaffree v. James, 52 U.S.L.W. 3557 (U.S. Nov. 14, 1983) (No. 83-812).
84. The Alabama school prayer statute states in part that:
At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades in all
public schools, the teacher in charge of the room in which each class is
held may announce that a period of silence not to exceed one minute in
duration shall be observed for meditation or voluntary prayer, and during
any such period no other activities shall be engaged in.
ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (1975) (emphasis added).
85. Waltz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) (upholding tax exemptions
to religious organizations for properties used solely for religious worship).
"[T] here is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which
will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interfer-
ence." Id.
86. See A. DE TOcQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY iN AMERICA 1835-40 (J. Mayer & M.
Lerner eds. 1966).
87. Address by President Reagan, Association of National Religious Broad-
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contains a challenge that is as real today as it was two hundred
years ago.
casters Annual Convention (January 31, 1983), reprinted in WEEKLY COMPAION
OF PRESmENTLAL DOCUMENTS, volume 19, No. 5, Jan. 31, 1983, at 155-58.

